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Abstract 
World-focused emotion experience (WFEE) is how the world appears or is consciously 
perceived in one’s emotion experience. For example, when happy the world may seem 
especially beautiful, or when sad the world may seem empty or barren of possibilities. What 
explains these kinds of experiences? WFEE has been relatively neglected by emotion theory, 
but is clinically relevant. This article discusses explanations of WFEE from phenomenology 
and Gestalt psychology. Influenced by Kurt Lewin, I propose an “emotional demand model” 
of WFEE. Emotional demand is defined as an impelling property of the world which exists 
because of one’s emotional state (of readiness for action). It is a concept with connects 
striving (in the self) with value (in the world), both of which are important from an 
evolutionary point of view. This theory explains the neglected distinction between the 
expressive and demanding qualities of emotional objects and has implications for emotion 
regulation, autism, and theory of mind. 
Keywords:  Emotion; world-focused; phenomenology; Gestalt, demand character; 
Lewin; autism; theory of mind 
Highlights: 
 Psychology is biased towards thinking of emotions as feelings rather than as 
experiences of the world. But they are both. 
 The best way to explain world-focused emotion is as the experience of “demand” in 
the world (the Emotional Demand Model). 
 For example, an angry face may be seen as “scary” (what is demands for me) rather 
than as “angry” (what the other person is expressing). Infants and individuals with 
autism may experience faces in a more “demanding” manner. 
 This model highlights another tool for recognizing our own emotions: noticing when 
we feel “demanded of” by the world; with implications for emotion regulation. 
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The demanding world of emotion: A Gestalt approach to emotion experience 
 
“At that time ordinary objects—chairs, tables, and the like— possessed a frightening, 
menacing quality...Time itself changed. The day went on for ever; the nights lasted for 
centuries.” (Rowe, 1978, pp. 269-70). 
 
This description of an experience of depression captures something often missed out by 
theories of emotion. When we have an emotion, the world changes. It appears in a certain 
light. But when psychologists give examples of what it feels like to have an emotion, usually 
the examples are biased towards the self or the body (see the review by Lambie & Marcel, 
2002). They typically mention tense muscles, gut feelings, bodily arousal, or feelings of “core 
affect” (pleasure and arousal). But the account of an experience of depression above 
describes a change in the world, not a change in myself, my body, or my feelings. 
This is a key aspect of the conscious experience of emotion that is not well 
understood by emotion theory. It has been called “world-focused emotion experience” 
(WFEE) by Lambie & Marcel (2002). A rough definition is that it is experience of the world 
in an emotional light, or how the world appears or is consciously perceived in emotion 
experience. Its opposite is self-focused emotion experience, which is experience of oneself or 
one’s body when having an emotion. For example, when I am angry I may be aware of my 
jaw being tight (self-focused) or I may be aware of you as a hateful jerk (world-focused). 
This can be a matter of selective attention (Lambie & Marcel, 2002). Theories of emotion 
from William James (1884) onwards have generally accounted more for self-focused emotion 
experience than world-focused emotion experience, and on the whole they do not even 
recognize that world-focused aspects of emotion experience are problematic or need to be 
explained. For example, emotion experiences are often viewed as bodily feelings of the 
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subject (James, 1884; Damasio, 1994) or other subjective feelings such as core affect 
(pleasure plus arousal) (Russell, 2003).  
Of course, many theories of emotion include the “object of the emotion” as one of its 
components (Lazarus, 1991; Russell, 2003; Frijda, 1986), but how the object is experienced 
phenomenologically in emotion is often left underspecified or is reduced to appraisal 
(Lazarus, 1991), or is claimed to be unnecessary for emotion experience (Russell, 2003). For 
example, Russell (2003) describes his influential theory of core affect as a search “for 
primitive concepts in emotional processes that can exist without Objects” (p. 147). 
This article, however, is explicitly about the experienced objects of emotion—how 
they are experienced from a first-person point of view and how we can conceptualize these 
experiences. The goal is to develop a phenomenology of world-focused emotion experience, 
to give an account of how the world is transformed in emotion experience. I will rely heavily 
on the gestalt approach to emotion experience developed by Lewin (1926) and Koffka 
(1935), which influenced Sartre’s (1939/1962) work on emotion experience, and I aim to 
build on these important but often neglected insights.  
The lack of an accurate conceptualization, let alone an accurate theory, of WFEE is a 
problem because several phenomena of emotion experience seem to depend on it. For 
example, several difficulties with emotional inhibition (e.g. anger disorders, borderline 
personality disorder), misattribution (e.g. seeing others as contemptible or threatening rather 
than oneself as contemptuous or anxious), and every day “unconscious” emotions can all 
plausibly be linked to a kind of emotion experience in which the subject is focused on the 
world rather than on herself (Lambie & Marcel, 2002). 
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1. The phenomena to be explained: Examples of reports of world-focused emotion 
experience 
There are plenty of examples in everyday discourse of self-focused emotion descriptions. “I 
have butterflies in my stomach”; “I have an unbearable feeling”; “I’m shaking all over”; “I 
feel as light as air”. But readers may be wondering what reports of world-focused emotion 
experience look like. See Table 1 for some illustrations. 
 [SEE NEXT PAGE] 
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Table 1 
Examples of Reports of World-Focused Emotion Experience 
Report Emotion 
 
“Everything seems more beautiful, natural, and desirable” * 
 
 
Happiness 
“This is so wonderful. Some people would do anything - that's so 
cool” † 
 
Happiness 
“What do you think you're doing, you're only a cyclist - you don't 
need the whole - you prat! Get out of my way, you idiot.” † 
 
Anger 
“Why don't they just go home? They deserve a good beating” † 
 
Anger 
“Everything seems useless, absurd, meaningless” * 
 
Depression 
“Shit, it is horrid, what am I going to do, ugly thing. I close my 
eyes, it's still there, I cannot get image out of my mind” † 
 
Fear 
“Death – graves. Loss. What's the point?” † 
 
Sadness 
“It feels like every wall is closing in towards me…Tunnel vision 
describes it perfectly.” ‡ 
 
Panic attack 
“Pictured him with the prettiest girl in the photo. Thought, Yeah 
right, him faithful? Yeah, like f***!" † 
 
Jealousy 
(romantic) 
“Git, always gets what he wants, and I get to help. Brat, thick git, 
loser.” † 
 
Jealousy 
(sibling) 
“The mannequins stood in unnatural angular poses. They seemed 
deeply malevolent…Indeed, this would be a key feature of my 
anxiety and depression…The sense that parts of the world 
contained a secret external malevolence that could press a 
despairing weight and pain into you” § 
Anxiety 
  
“How gorgeous you look tonight” † Love 
 
Note:  Asterisks in the quotes are not editorial but were in the original report. 
Sources: * = Davtiz (1969); † = Lambie (2017); ‡ = Holmes (2015); § = Haig (2018). 
 
 What do people mean when they say that, in their emotion experience, a spider looks 
horrid, the world seems malevolent, or a loved one looks gorgeous? When we have an 
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emotion experience (e.g. anger, love, fear, etc.) and some of the content of that experience is 
the world in an emotional light (e.g. a hateful, lovely, scary object, etc.), how are we to 
explain and characterize that world-focused emotion experience? What explains how the 
world transformed in emotion experience? The rest of this paper will attempt to unpack and 
answer these questions. 
 The strategy will be to first outline some definitions (section 2), and then to examine 
some of the earliest accounts of world-focused emotion experience from pragmatists and 
phenomenologists (section 3). Then in section 4, we will look at how the Gestalt 
psychologists Kurt Lewin and Kurt Koffka provide some useful conceptual tools that can be 
used to apply to world-focused emotion experience. These concepts – of demand character 
and hodological space – have been neglected by emotion theory, but section 5 will attempt a 
new synthesis of them in the name of the “emotional demand model”. The implications of 
this new model will be examined in section 6. 
2. Definitions 
Before we proceed, this section will lay out some definitions, which broadly follow those 
given by Lambie & Marcel (2002). These definitions are stipulative and merely point to how 
key terms are being used here.  
Emotions are taken to be bodily, evaluative, and attitudinal states or processes 
normally caused by or implying that something matters to the organism about the situation it 
is in. Mattering means that the situation is relevant to one of the organisms concerns, e.g. a 
concern for safety, or for looking after offspring, or for defending resources, etc. (Frijda, 
1986). The emotion state is attitudinal in that (a) it is non-neutral, with regard either to (a part 
or whole of) the world or to the self, and so implying that something has been evaluated, and 
(b) it expresses how an organism is positioned in relation to something (e.g., being prepared 
to avoid or attack it). The attitude is typically physical, for example, one’s body posture 
Lambie (2019). Demanding World of Emotion. Accepted 30/07/19 for New Ideas in Psychology.  
8 
 
getting ready to slump down in despair, or to attack in anger (albeit subject to inhibition), but 
there are also mental states and thoughts which accompany and reflect these physical 
attitudes. See also Dewey (1895) for a similar attitudinal definition of emotion. 
With regard to the conscious aspect of an emotion state, phenomenal emotion 
experience (also, for brevity, “emotion experience”) is defined as “what it is like” to be in an 
emotion state. Any aspect of the emotion state regarding which there is “something it is like” 
to be in or to have that state is part of phenomenal emotion experience. For example, this may 
include what it is like to experience faster breathing, or to see someone as to-be-attacked, or 
to feel a flush in one’s face, or one’s muscles as tense, or one’s thoughts as racing, or one’s 
situation as hopeless, etc. Phenomenal emotion experience does not imply that one is aware 
of emotion qua emotion. Animals may have phenomenal emotion experiences (in that there is 
something it feels like for an animal to be bodily aroused) without the animal ever being 
aware of “anger” or “fear” etc. as concepts. A further stage of attention and categorization is 
necessary for awareness of emotion qua emotion (Lambie & Marcel, 2002). 
The distinction between self-focused and world-focused experience is one of content 
and experienced location. All perceptual experience is spatial, and one aspect of this spatiality 
is the sense of myself, and my body being “here” with a world being separately “out there”. 
The nature of this kind of self versus world perception is that of a reciprocal figure-ground 
relationship. As Gibson (1986) has pointed out, exteroperception simultaneously specifies the 
spatiality of the world and one’s own location and spatiality. For example, Lambie and 
Marcel write: 
Consider the situation of pressure contact between the pad of your forefinger and the 
horizontal edge of a table. Simply through a shift in attention, you can experience 
either of two things: (a) the sensation, in the inner end of your finger, of indentation 
and pressure, which has a shape and orientation; or (b) the perception of the edge of 
an external object, which has a shape, texture, orientation, mass, and location. The 
single informational state due to receptors in your finger in mechanical contact with 
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another object can lead to awareness of either of the above. These two experiential 
contents may not be strictly mutually exclusive—the bodily sensation may not 
entirely disappear when you attend to the object and vice versa—but their relation is 
(at least) that of alternative figure and ground (p. 236). 
 
What of the terms “affect” and “feeling”? The term “affect” has had an inconsistent 
use in psychology (see the review by Batson, Shaw, & Oleson, 1992) and sometimes it is 
simply used interchangeably with “emotion”, other times more specifically to refer the 
conscious aspect of an emotion (e.g. in Freud, 1926). In the “core affect” model of Russell 
(2003) core affect refers to a primitive non-reflective conscious feeling of pleasure-
displeasure, and activation-deactivation. This usage of “affect” has been recently influential. 
In the present article, the term “affect” will not be used. Insofar as affect refers to the 
conscious aspect of emotion, the term for this in the present article is “emotion experience”. 
One aspect of emotion experience may therefore be core affect in Russell’s sense, but as this 
is self-focused emotion experience (being a subjective feeling) it does not play a major role in 
this article. Insofar as “affect” may refer to the “subjective quale” of emotion over and above 
all the other aspects of phenomenal emotion experience – a kind of free-floating extra feeling 
to be added to the phenomenal experience of body, thoughts and perceptions— it is a matter 
of debate whether such free-floating feelings exist. For example, while some propose that the 
brain can produce, for example, free-floating anger or free-floating sadness, etc. (i.e. a pure 
feeling with no content other than “anger feeling” or “sadness feeling” (e.g. Cannon, 1927; 
MacLean, 1993; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987), another more phenomenological tradition 
denies that such disconnected feelings exist. On this latter view, emotion experiences always 
have content; they are always about something, or attach themselves to an object (e.g. Dewey, 
1985; Sartre, 1939/1962; Frijda, 1986; see Lambie & Marcel, 2002 for a more detailed 
account of this debate). Since the present article is only concerned with how the world 
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appears in emotion experience, we can bracket this debate about whether or not ‘free-
floating’ or objectless emotions exist. 
The term “feeling” also will not be used as a technical term in this article. It will be 
used only in an everyday sense to refer to bodily sensation, including those bodily sensations 
associated with emotion, and also loosely as a synonym for self-focused emotional 
experiences. Again, the overall technical term for the conscious aspect of emotion in the 
present article is “emotion experience”. 
3. Background: Pragmatic and Phenomenological Approaches to World-Focused 
Emotion 
To begin our analysis, we need to look at early accounts of world-focused emotion, and to 
that end this section will look at the work of Dewey (1895), Sartre (1939/1962), and Merleau-
Ponty (1945/1962).  
Much theorizing on emotion in the 20th century was a reaction to William James’s 
influential account of emotion as bodily experience. Although early critics such as Dewey 
(1895) pointed out the neglect of the world in James’s account, later psychologists arguably 
compounded the error by simply focusing on other self-focused aspects such as brain-
produced “subjective feelings” (Cannon, 1927; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987) or “core 
affect” (Russell, 2003).  
James famously wrote that “My theory . . . is that the bodily changes follow directly 
the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS 
the emotion” (1890/1981, p. 1065); and “If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to 
abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have 
nothing left behind” (p. 1067). This view of emotion firmly placed it as a subjective feeling, 
as the feeling of one’s own body: an emotion is the experience of trembling, shaking, of one’s 
pounding heart, and so on. The object of the emotion – for example the bear we encounter in 
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the woods – was relegated to a causal role. The bear for James is the “the exciting fact”, the 
perception of which causes the bodily changes, and it is the feeling of the bodily changes 
which constitutes the emotion. The bear, whether as cause or object of the emotion, is 
therefore not constitutive of the emotion experience. 
 There was a reaction against this overly subjective view of emotion from both 
pragmatists such as Dewey (1895) and phenomenologists such as Sartre (1939/1962) and 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962).  In the rest of this section I shall briefly outline these objections 
as they have influenced the account of world-focused emotion experience that is to be 
presented in this article. 
John Dewey’s (1895) aim in his theory of emotion was to modify Darwin and James’s 
views of emotion: he thought that emotions are neither “expressions” (which he argued only 
exist in the eye of the beholder) and nor are they to be equated simply with experienced 
bodily feedback. Dewey’s (1895) view was that an emotion is a purposive mode of 
behaviour, an action tendency, and not just a feeling: “anger means a tendency to explode in a 
sudden attack, not a mere state of feeling” (p. 17). This action tendency always has an object. 
He held that all emotion experiences are directed at an object (and that without an object an 
emotion is a mere “spasm” [p. 17]). Emotions are derived from instrumental actions like 
running away and fighting but what makes emotions distinct from mere instrumental actions 
is that they are (partially) inhibited actions—they have “become reduced to tendencies to 
action, to attitudes” (p. 32). It is the conflict or struggle between action and inhibition that 
characterizes emotion. 
Interestingly Dewey also argued that the emotional reaction of the subject and the 
object of emotion were not really separate but were conjoined as a single process – a “single 
pulse of emotion” (p. 17). When we are frightened of a bear, wrote Dewey, the actual bear 
that causes the fear is not the object of the emotion experience: the particular object of the 
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emotion “is an abstraction from the activity just as much as is the ‘feel’” (p. 20). The object 
of the emotion experience is “that terrible bear” but this is part of a single process: the “whole 
activity which may be described equally well as that terrible ‘bear’, or ‘Oh how frightened I 
am’” (p. 20). This view is very close to the view of Lambie & Marcel (2002) that a single 
“action attitude” (emotion state) has both world and self-specifications that are reciprocal 
(e.g. “me [escape from] bear”) and that attention can be focused on either side of this 
reciprocal attitude. Indeed, Dewey remarks that it is “bear-as-thing-to-be-run-from” (p. 22) 
that is actually the object of the emotion experience. 
Sartre’s (1939/1962) view of emotion shares some features with Dewey’s – there is a 
common focus on intentionality and on the phenomenological object of the emotion. Sartre 
also argues that emotional action is not identical with instrumental action, but he has a 
different take on what this difference is. For Sartre, unlike Dewey, it is not inhibition which is 
key to this difference, but rather how emotion acts to “transform” the world. 
There are two key features in Sartre’s account which are relevant for our topic of 
world-focused emotion experience. The first is the notion of non-reflective emotion 
experience, and the second is the notion of the “transformation of the world”. In both of these 
areas, Sartre is clearly influenced by Kurt Lewin (whom he explicitly refers to) but he has his 
own original take on the phenomena. To take non-reflective emotion experience first, Sartre 
points out that to have a conscious emotion experience (for example anger experience) is not 
the same as being conscious of an emotion (being conscious of anger). When I am angry with 
you I may be aware of how annoying you are, not of how angry I am. To take one of Sartre’s 
examples, to feel revulsion at the sight of a particular person is to be absorbed with the 
detestable qualities of that individual. It is a direct engagement with the world, with how that 
person appears to you. It is not be conscious of “revulsion”:  that is a later reflective state, one 
which we may never engage in, if we move quickly on or have no reason or desire to reflect 
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on our experience. Likewise, to feel despair is not to be conscious of “despair”, but to 
experience a world in which all possibilities seems barred to me (this last example is very 
Lewinian; see section 4). As Hatzimoysis (2009) summarizes Sartre’s view “for an 
experience to be conscious it need not take itself as its intentional object” (p. 226). 
The second of Sartre’s insights which is of relevance here is that of how the world is 
“transformed” in emotion experience. Sartre writes of a “magical” transformation, by which 
he simply means that instead of changing the world in “practical” or instrumental ways, an 
emotion changes perception of reality such that the agent is responding to a transformed 
world. Imagine you see a bear and this leads to fear and then you decide that the best course 
of action is to run away. This is not an analysis of emotional response but of prudential 
action, according to Sartre. As Hatzimoysis (2009) writes:  
Running out of prudence is acting according to a plan; emotional fleeing, on the other 
hand, is a ‘magical behaviour which negates the dangerous object with one’s whole 
body, by reversing the vectorial structure of the space we live in and suddenly 
creating a potential direction on the other side’ (STE 43). It is not a case of reaching 
for shelter (as in prudential behaviour) but of ‘forgetting’ or ‘negating’ the threat. The 
dangerous object is the focal point of fear, and – contrary to the case of prudential 
action – the faster one runs (the louder one shouts, the further one withdraws) the 
more afraid (or angry, or sad) one feels. 
This is a highly original analysis of emotion experience which has not fully been taken on 
board by emotion theory. Although the claim may be too strong if taken to imply that all 
emotion response is “magical” rather than adaptive, it has clear relevance for certain 
paradoxes in clinical psychology in which phenomena such as self-harm or severe self-
criticism seem objectively maladaptive (e.g. you already feel bad so your solution is to attack 
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yourself even more) yet phenomenologically are experienced as functional in some way (see 
Gilbert & Procter, 2006). 
For Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) emotions are constituted by actions in the world over 
time (Krueger, 2012). Again, emotions are not “inner feelings”, as in the approaches of James 
(1890) or Russell (2003) but instead are styles of “being in the world”: dynamic engagements 
of a bodily agent interacting with the world: 
I perceive the grief or anger of the other in his conduct, in his face or his hands, 
without recourse to any “inner” experience of suffering or anger, and because grief 
and anger are variations of belonging to the world, undivided between the body and 
consciousness, and equally applicable to the other person’s conduct, visible in his 
phenomenal body (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 356). 
 
4. Gestalt Psychology and World-Focused Emotion: Lewin & Koffka 
Although Dewey and Sartre brought more attention to the object of emotions, it was the work 
of the Gestalt psychologists Lewin (1926) and Koffka (1935) that really fleshed out a 
conceptual scheme that could explain why emotional objects are experienced in the particular 
way they are. In fact, Lewin’s work was an influence on Sartre’s account of emotion. Sadly, 
modern emotion theory has largely neglected the insights of Lewin and Koffka, and this 
section will probe these insights in some detail, before we introduce an updated model based 
in part on these insights in section 5. The Gestalt psychologists were the first to introduce a 
conceptual grounding to the notion of WFEE, and the key concepts they used were 
physiognomic character, demand character, and hodological space. 
4.1. Physiognomic Character 
Koffka (1935) uses the term “physiognomic character” (originally coined by Werner in 1932) 
to refer to the emotional characteristics of objects. The term “physiognomy” refers to reading 
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character from faces, so the connotation here is that objects express emotional character – 
they can look proud or sad, angry or menacing. Some of Koffka’s examples of physiognomic 
character include: the gruesomeness of a corpse, the sex appeal of a person, the formidable 
look of an opponent, a friendly or an unfriendly face. Köhler (1930) also analyzed this 
phenomenon and both Koffka and Köhler included inanimate examples of physiognomic 
character, for example, menacing thunder, sad music, and joyful flowers. But how is this 
possible? Where do these qualities come from? For Köhler, inanimate physiognomic 
character derives its emotionality from dynamic similarities with human bodily emotion:  
All physical events or states which send similar constellations of stimuli to our eyes 
and ears, as issue from the physical body of another person, will look or sound 
“emotional”, “restless”, “directed towards something”, “determined”, and so forth, 
just as a living person does. No one can hear naively the rumbling crescendo of 
thunder without thus understanding it as “menacing” (Köhler, 1930; p. 203). 
In fact, Koffka argued that experiencing physiognomic character is our primary default way 
of experiencing the world:  “the more primitive a behavioural world is, the more 
physiognomic it is” (p. 660), meaning that young children will tend to experience a world full 
of physiognomic character. This is illustrated by his 1924 experiments with babies: 
 “the child recognizes its mother’s face as early as the second month, and in the 
middle of the first year it reacts quite differently to a “friendly” face than it does to an 
“angry” face…Furthermore the difference is of a kind which obliges us to conclude 
that “friendly” and “angry” faces are phenomenal facts to the infant” (Koffka, 1924; 
p. 134). 
But can physiognomic character explain WFEE? Remember a prototypical example of WFEE 
would be something like this: a moment ago you seemed nice and lovely, and now I am angry 
you seem horrible. So this depends on my emotion state: when I am angry, you seem hateful. 
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But Koffka’s physiognomic characters do not necessarily depend on my state – a corpse can 
look gruesome whatever state I am in, and a beautiful person can still look beautiful, even if I 
hate them or am angry with them.  
 Furthermore, what exactly does “looking angry” mean? We tend to have a bias that 
this means “being able to be labelled as angry”, but does this explain how a baby (or a chimp, 
or a dog) sees an angry face? There is an important distinction here that is rarely noticed or 
commented on by emotion researchers. This is the distinction between the expressive and the 
demanding properties of an emotional face. We shall have more to say about this in the next 
section. 
4.2. Demand Character 
Demand character was a notion introduced by Kurt Lewin in 1926. Writing in 
German, he used the term Aufforderungscharaktere. There are some problems with how this 
has been translated (see Appendix: Note on translating Lewin). In the present paper, 
following Koffka (1935), I have translated this as “demand character”.   
Lewin (1926) viewed demand character as the “impelling” quality of objects in the 
world. He wrote that not only can objects in the world be pleasant or unpleasant but they:  
“are not neutral towards us in our role as acting beings… They challenge us to certain 
activities. Good weather and certain landscapes entice one to a walk. A stairway 
stimulates the two-year-old to climb it and jump down; doors, to open and close them; 
small crumbs, to pick them up; dogs, to pet them; building stones, to play with them; 
the chocolate and a piece of cake want to be eaten.” (Lewin, 1926/1999; p. 95, 
emphases in the original).1 
                                                            
1 The citation of Lewin (1926/1999) refers to the translation by D. Rapaport. In all quotations from this 
I have changed “valence” to “demand character” (see explanation in Appendix: Note on translating Lewin). 
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Crucially, demand character, for Lewin, depends on the current need state of the actor, and is 
reciprocal with need – the stairway will not entice the two-year-old to jump if she is tired; the 
chocolate will not look “to-be-eaten” if I am full. We can see here straightaway some 
differences between the idea of physiognomic and demand character. If physiognomic 
character is what the object expresses, demand character is what the object compels. For 
example, look at the face in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Is this face angry or scary? What it expresses and what it compels are different: 
Physiognomic versus demand character [Image from Amsterdam dynamic facial expressions set]. 
 
What the faces expresses is anger, and in Ekman-style experiments (Ekman, 1994) 
that is what you would be expected to say if you were asked what the person is feeling. But 
what the face compels in the viewer is different – it is “scariness” or “to-be-avoidedness”. Is 
this what the infants in Koffka’s (1924) study experienced when their mother made an angry 
face (see above)? That this is likely to be the case is suggested by a classic study by Haviland 
and Lelwica (1987). 
Haviland and Lelwica (1987) looked at how 10 week old infants responded to the 
emotional expressions of their mothers. Each mother displayed facial and vocal expressions 
of 3 emotions – joy, sadness, and anger – in 15 second bursts and their babies’ responses were 
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coded. Haviland and Lelwica expected that there would be some facial matching by the 
infants on the assumption that “repeated presentations of an emotion should induce a similar 
affective state” (p. 98). In so doing they were explicitly following Tomkins’ (1962) claim that 
“All affects…are specific activators of themselves—the principle of contagion” (cited in 
Haviland & Lelwica, pp. 97-8). They also noted that this would not be simple imitation, but 
rather matching via induced state. 
The results were interesting. The babies did show significant matching of their 
mother’s joy faces, but not of their sadness faces (although mothers’ sadness faces led to a 
significant increase in the infants showing a “mouthing” response2). The response to anger 
faces was interesting: some babies did show matching, but a full third of the sample “were 
unable to complete this condition because the anger display induced intense crying in them” 
(p. 100). These infants were then excluded from the subsequent analysis. 
But, it seems sensible to conclude that these infants were responding to the demand 
character of the angry faces, not their expressive character. The demand character of an angry 
face is that it is scary or threatening, not that it is “angry”. Tomkins (1962) was wrong to 
assume that all emotions are activators of themselves in others. While this may be often the 
case for a joyful smiling face (smiles begetting smiles), it is not necessarily true of other 
emotions such as anger, pride, or sadness. For example, an angry expression may make you 
frightened rather than angry, an expression of pride from an opponent may lead you to feel 
annoyance rather than pride, and an expression of sadness may lead you to feel compassion 
rather than sadness. 
What Haviland and Lelwicka (1987) found, but did not notice, was a flaw in one of 
the assumptions of the Tomkins/Ekman tradition of research into emotional “expressions”. In 
                                                            
2 Haviland and Lelwicka (1987, p. 103) write that mouthing “consisted of mouth manipulations 
including lip and tongue sucking and pushing the lips in and out. This behavior did not occur frequently under 
the other conditions. The infants' mouthing behaviors in response to the sad expressions could be seen as self-
soothing”. This is another example of a perceived face compelling an action (in this case soothing). 
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this tradition participants are asked to read other people’s emotional expressions. But other 
people’s emotions do not only have expressive (physiognomic) character, they also have 
demand character. Often an angry face is “scary” before (or rather than) “angry”. Certainly, 
for a young infant it seems plausible that an angry face is experienced as scary – meaning a 
thing to be avoided – before it is seen in a “theory of mind” sense as an expression of 
another’s state. 
This distinction is almost never mentioned in research inspired by Ekman’s influential 
facial expression paradigm. Another way to understand the distinction is that the demand 
characters depend on the need state of the subject but expressive (physiognomic) characters 
do not. As Koffka writes: “The attractiveness of an eatable object would have to be called a 
demand character, inasmuch as it disappears in states of satiety, and a physiognomic character 
inasmuch as it depends on the properties of the food object itself” (Koffka, 1935, p. 363) 
 Importantly Lewin (1926/1999) argued that demand character was not simply a binary 
concept of attraction vs repulsion (or positive vs negative):  
We distinguish positive and negative demand characters, according to whether we are 
attracted by something… or repelled by it…It would be, however, a mistake to 
assume that this is the crucial feature of demand characters. It is more characteristic 
for demand characters that they press toward definite actions, the range of which may 
be narrow or broad…The book entices reading, the cake to eating, the ocean to 
swimming... (Lewin, 1926/1999, p. 95, emphasis added). 
So, there are as many demand characters as there are actions that humans can perform. This 
point makes the subsequent translation of demand characters into simple positive or negative 
“valences” extremely problematic. (See Appendix: Note on translating Lewin.) 
 Lewin also emphasized that “A man’s world changes fundamentally when his 
fundamental goals of will change” (1926/1999, p. 96). When your goals change “Familiar 
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things may then suddenly acquire a new look” (p. 96)3. This is because the demand character 
of the world changes when your goals change. Dramatic examples are provided in Lewin’s 
(1917/2009) essay, the Landscape of War, written when he was an infantryman in the First 
World War. Before the war a particular landscape was “round, without front or behind”, but 
when at war exactly the same landscape was experienced differently: “the expansion into 
infinity no longer applies unconditionally. The area seems to come to an end somewhere in 
the direction of the Front; the landscape is bounded” (Lewin, 1917/2009, p. 201). Or, when 
an area is no longer a combat zone, “The character of danger has been abolished...Where a 
shallow depression [previously] struck one as good cover, one now only sees level, if gently 
undulating land without any actual height differences” (p. 208). Lewin (1917/2009) was at 
pains to emphasize that such differences were phenomenologically perceived and not just 
“imagined”.  
Demand characters become relevant for emotion when we consider both (a) the 
reciprocal nature of subjective need and objective demand, and (b) the fact that demands can 
be defined by actions to be performed. I shall expand on this in Section 5. 
4.3. Hodological Space 
Hodological space was another term introduced by Kurt Lewin, this time in 1938 to 
refer to psychological paths within a person’s “life space”. The life space, for Lewin, is the 
total situation which influences a person’s behavior and consists of the person and their 
environment in interaction with each other (Lewin, 1936). So, behaviour is not a function of 
the environment as the behaviourists argued (see Watson, 1924; Skinner, 1953) but a function 
                                                            
3 In the novel The Thirteenth Tale (Setterfield, 2006), Hester starts to fall in love with the doctor but 
doesn’t realize this. She discovers it only after she notices that he now looks different: “Then the most 
unexpected thing happened. The doctor’s face changed. Yes, changed, before my very eyes. It was one of 
those moments when a face comes suddenly into new focus, when the features, all recognizably as they were 
before, are prone to a dizzying shift and present themselves in an unexpected new light”. Because of this she 
realizes she loves him. This illustrates Lewin’s point that experiencing a changed world can give one knowledge 
about oneself. 
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of person plus environment, which Lewin would often write as B = f [P,E] . In order to 
characterize this we need, in addition to the demand character of objects or situations, the 
concept of forces which act upon people, with a strength and a direction. These forces are 
vectors which create paths in a path space, a “hodological space”. 
For Lewin, the whole state of the person and environment taken together [P,E] is the 
“psychological field” or “life space”. One way to think about this is as follows: the life space 
is the environment as imbued with one’s personal tendencies, attributes, and knowledge. For 
example, let’s consider a mundane case. I am in town and I feel hungry. It is not that hunger 
in me simply triggers food seeking behaviour [PB], or indeed the other way round that I 
see a restaurant and that makes me salivate [EB]. Instead, the whole psychological 
situation, or the life space [P,E] is like this: whereas before I was hungry the town for me was 
a series of shops and people more or less indifferently spaced and of varying degrees of 
interest, now I see only possibilities for food—I see a path to that now very attractive pizza 
stand. “It is as though a groove had formed in a plane surface and you were being forced 
down that groove” to use a phrase from Koffka (1935, p. 43). The groove or path is part of 
my current “life space” [P,E] and it is this that determines my behaviour.  
Now let’s consider how the notion of the life space determining behaviour can be 
applied to emotion. When I am very angry, you suddenly become “someone to-be-attacked”. 
When I am anxious about the exam, I now see the previously mundane corridor in which the 
exam room sits as leading to my doom: I don’t want to go down that corridor, and the nearer I 
get to the exam room the more I want to go the other way. The corridor now has negative 
valence or “to-be-avoided” demand character. 
In order to represent direction in the life space, Lewin introduced the notion of 
hodological space, from the Greek “hodos”, meaning path. Hodological space is “an 
empirical space which is not identical with the physical one” (Lewin, 1938, p. 1). He writes 
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that “the purpose of hodological space is to find a type of geometry which permits the use of 
direction in a manner which will correspond essentially to the meaning that direction has in 
psychology” (p. 23). There are two keys ways in which hodological space differs from 
Euclidean space. First, because hodological space is divided into subregions (e.g. “home”, 
“work”, “safe places”, “dangerous places”, etc.), the shortest distance between two points in 
hodological space is not necessarily a straight line between them as in Euclidean space. The 
shortest or best path to school in hodological space may be the path that avoids the scary 
street, even though that street would be the shortest route in Euclidean space (see Figure 4, 
top). And second, hodological space distinguishes direction toward and direction away from. 
Paths to or away from situations or objects are experienced as “welcoming” or “attractive” or 
“easy” versus “unwelcoming” or “repelling” or “difficult/ blocked” (see Lambie & Marcel, 
2002). 
 An emotional example from Lewin (1935) is that of hopelessness. Sometimes we are 
in situations in which all areas of the life space seem to have negative demand character (see 
Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C 
Lambie (2019). Demanding World of Emotion. Accepted 30/07/19 for New Ideas in Psychology.  
23 
 
Figure 2. Hopelessness (hodological space of).  
All areas of experienced path space have negative demand character for child C. The arrows are all 
away from each aspect of the world, showing that nothing is attractive and there are no possibilities 
for action in the world. [After Lewin, 1935, p. 95.] 
 
Lewin (1935) accompanied Figure 2 with a photograph of a very small child who 
seems to have physically crumpled: rolled into a ball, with his head almost between its legs 
and his arms covering his head. He writes: “The child, despairing, contracts, physically and 
psychically, under the vectors coming from all sides” (1935, p. 94). Alternatively, the child in 
this situation may have an emotional outburst, or a “flight to unreality”, i.e. try to escape in 
imagination, or in severe instances, escape through self-destruction. Consider this example 
from Lewin: 
“If the barrier is very firm, there is no way out for the child… As a result of her 
parents’ strictness, Martha, ten years of age, lived in constant terror of poor grades at 
school… It was so strong that the child often cried out in her sleep, ran to her 
mother’s bed, and wanted to stay with her because she was afraid. Her parents treated 
Martha very sternly. Once the mother threatened, “If you are not promoted you need 
not come back home!”. After this utterance the child entertained thoughts of suicide.” 
(Lewin, 1935; p. 140). 
What this example illustrates is that the world-focused emotion experience of one’s life 
situation is often of immense importance and can be utterly constraining on an individual, 
sometimes even more so than one’s “intense feelings” (e.g. feeling sick to one’s stomach). 
But, psychology and therapy often pays more attention to feelings and symptoms than to 
one’s emotional life situation or hodological space.  
 Lambie and Marcel (2002) applied the notion of hodological space to emotion 
experience, and gave some characterizations relevant to different emotions (see Table 2).  
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Table 2 
Examples of hodological space for different emotions (from Lambie & Marcel, 2002) 
Emotion Hodological Space 
 
  
Joy Open, inviting, welcoming, nonresistant, supportive 
 
Sadness Empty, closed, burdening, lacking in attractiveness 
 
Anger Impeding, blocking, requiring force to remove blocking agent 
 
Fear Overwhelming, piercing, disintegrative, to be moved away from 
 
Shame The impinging gaze of others 
 
Pride The welcoming gaze of others 
 
 
4.4. Gerundival Perception 
Gerundival perception was a term introduced by Lambie & Marcel (2002) and was defined as 
the world-focused counterpart to an action urge. In grammar a gerundive is a form of verb 
that functions as an adjective and means “that should or must or is appropriate to be done”. 
For example, in Latin, the gerundive form for the verb amare (to love) is amandus (e.g. 
“amandus est” – he must be loved). In English there is no gerundival form of verbs as such, 
but you can say “he is to be loved”, or “that is a book to be read”. 
However, because emotions are relational phenomena, that is, not properties of the 
agent alone but of the agent in relation to its environment (Frijda, 1986), then an action 
readiness urge such as feeling ready to attack, or feeling ready to flee, should have a world-
focused counterpart: something is experienced as to be attacked; or something is experienced 
as to be fleed from. This latter phenomenon is called gerundival perception. Lambie & 
Marcel (2002) write that one aspect of WFEE is “of a figural object with a phenomenological 
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property of impellingness that is the world counterpart of a self-focused action urge. This 
property we call “gerundival” ” (p. 239). Gerundival perceptions were anticipated by William 
James who wrote “To the broody hen... a nestful of eggs... [is a] never-to-be-too-much-sat-
upon object” (1890; vol 2, p. 387). 
 Gerundival perceptions are similar to demand characters, and are a subset of them, but 
they are explicitly tied to emotion and are used as a technical term for the world-focused 
aspect of an emotional action urge. Examples of action urges and their gerundival 
counterparts are shown in Table 3.   
 
Table 3. Examples of felt action urges and reciprocal gerundival perceptions (from Lambie & Marcel, 
2002). 
Emotion Felt action urge (self-focused) Gerundival perception (world-
focused) 
   
Anger  My urge to attack (X) X to-be-attacked (by me) 
Fear  My urge to escape from (X) X to-be-escaped from (by me) 
Joy  My urge to interact with (the world) World to-be-interacted-with (by me) 
Sadness  My urge to withdraw from 
interaction (with the world) 
World not-to-be-interacted-with (by 
me) 
Shame  My urge to hide myself away (from 
others) 
Others’ gaze to-be-avoided (by me) 
Pride  My urge to display myself (to others) Others to-be-displayed-to (by me) 
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5. A New Model of Emotional Demand Character 
 The analysis of the concepts in section 4 suggests a synthesis of demand character, 
hodological space, and gerundival perception in explaining WFEE. It also suggests an 
important distinction between physiognomic and demand character, with only the latter 
constitutive of emotion experience. Let us call the new synthesis, the “emotional demand 
model” of emotion experience. 
The Emotional Demand Model, then, states that the phenomenology of WFEE 
consists of gerundival perceptions within a hodological space. In other words, in world-
focused emotion you experience a world of paths or obstacles (hodological space) containing 
objects as demanding certain actions to be done (gerundival perception). Taken together, 
gerundival perceptions within a hodological space are collectively known as the “emotional 
demand character” of the experienced world.  
Within a functional or cognitive psychology framework, the processes underlying 
such experiences are as follows. The environment is constantly being scanned in relation to 
one’s concerns (Frijda, 1986), and when an event is appraised as relevant to a concern (for 
example, that the lion over there is dangerous), emotions arise which are “action attitudes” 
(Lambie & Marcel, 2002). The process of attending to the world aspect of this attitudinal 
state yields gerundival perception of the lion-to-be-fleed-from. (Self-focused attention to this 
state yields a different kind of emotion experience – a feeling of my body being ready to run. 
Consider the example given in section 2 of pressing one’s finger against the table: the same 
sensory information can yield pressure feeling in my finger or perceptual description of the 
hardness of table). The appraisal process itself (although it may often be brief and 
nonconscious) also affects emotion experience. For example, let’s say the situation has been 
assessed in terms of the lion being dangerous relative to my coping resources. This appraisal 
shapes the hodological experience – for example, “grooves”, “avenues of escape”, “barriers” 
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etc. are thereby seen in the phenomenal field as part of the emotion experience. See Figure 3 
for a summary of the Emotional Demand Model of WFEE, in terms of both phenomenology 
and underlying processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Emotional Demand Model of World-Focused Emotion Experience.  
 
The phenomenology of emotional demand can be described in terms of two things: 
conation and value. As a result of evolution, emotions are conative (they involve striving) and 
the world of emotion (the world in an emotional light) is a world of high value. These two 
facts – striving and value – are connected phenomenologically in the experience of emotional 
demand. Emotional demand character means that the emotional world is not simply a world 
of high value – appealing or unappealing, good or bad – but rather is a world perceived as 
compelling you to do things. Emotional demand characters are the impelling (demanding) 
properties of the world which exist because of one’s emotional state (i.e. the underlying 
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action attitude). These include things like: the unbearable disarray of untidy books that must 
be realigned (because of my state of anxiety); the beautiful face that must be kissed (because 
of my love, or my sexual desire); the person who must be denigrated (because of my anger); 
the path through life that seems impossible (because of my hopelessness). 
Hodological space is experienced path space and it is important to note that (a) it can 
exist without emotion, but also (b) that it is heavily transformed by emotion and can be 
created by it. In terms of existing independently of emotion, many paths and obstacles in life 
are ecologically and socially real. Powerless people in a society (children, slaves, victims of 
racial or sexual discrimination) really do have life paths blocked. On the other hand, a 
powerful and wealthy individual may, due to depression for example, also experience a lack 
of options in hodological space. But the “socially real” and “emotional overlay” aspects of 
hodological space interact with each other—existing grooves and blockages in one’s 
hodological space are modified by one’s emotion state. 
 For example, there is a good reason why individuals with borderline personality 
disorder have a tendency to experience others as “untrustworthy” (Beck, Freeman, & Davis, 
2004), in line with abuse and trauma in early childhood (Nicol, Pope, Sprengelmeyer, Young 
& Hall, 2013). But this is also heightened by emotion—with anxiety and resentment 
increasing the emotional demand of untrustworthiness (Fonagy, Luyten & Allison, 2015). In 
later life the emotional demand character of untrustworthiness may be maintained more by 
the emotions of anxiety and resentment than by what is “socially real”. In other words, the 
individual comes to experience everyone as untrustworthy, as a function of, but also as a 
constitutive part of, their anxiety. 
In everyday cases, how one experiences emotional demand in the world is influenced 
by one’s activated concerns and subsequent emotion state. For example, Figure 4 illustrates a 
world-focused experience of fear (top) and affection (bottom). In this case the hodological 
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space and the demand character is an “overlay” in that the same scene is transformed: in the 
one case I am concerned about my safety at night and am fearful of (and want to be avoid) 
the figure in the dark street; in the other, I am out looking for my lost son, and I am drawn to 
the figure looks like it might be him. 
 
 
Figure 4. Emotional demand in hodological (path) space.  
Emotions can be experienced as a world of paths and obstacles containing objects that demand certain 
actions be taken. The nature of the demand away from (top) or towards (bottom) objects depends on 
one’s activated concern and related emotion state. [Picture: Ella Stavrou]. 
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Prototypical kinds of emotional demand for different emotions are illustrated in 
Figure 5. The emotional demand diagrams can be summarized as follows4. Joy is an 
experience of a world to be interacted with, with a certain urgency, with an overflow of 
activation which can be attached to different objects (think of the footballer who has scored a 
goal who runs, jumps, hugs different people around him). The direction of joy is not 
necessarily focused on one object but can be the world in general with a full 360 degree 
orientation. Fear is movement away from a specific object or situation, with an urge to avoid 
and a perception of an object or situation to be strongly avoided. Anger is movement towards 
a specific object with an urge to attack and an experience of an object to be attacked. Sadness, 
in hodological (path) terms, is an experience of absence of object and an incapacity of action 
or loss of activation. Love or affection is an experience of an object to be cared for (“never-
too-much-to-be-hugged”), with an urge to move towards and embrace. 
More complex emotions can also be accounted for on this model. For example, envy 
involves experiencing an object (or life situation) of another as to-be-appropriated or to-be-
possessed; shame involves experiencing others’ gaze as to-be-avoided; pride as experiencing 
others’ to-be-displayed-to; and jealousy (of the sexual kind) involves two others, one 
experienced as to-be-controlled or to-be-possessed, and another as to-be-attacked or to-be-
driven-away. Since emotions are not static but are in constant flux, it is to be assumed that the 
emotional demand characters of objects can change over time in the course of emotional 
interactions. For example, a person in an intense argument with a romantic partner may 
experience them shifting from “to-be-cared for”, to “to-be-attacked”, to “to-be-avoided”, 
back to “to-be-cared for” over the course of several minutes as their affective quality shifts 
                                                            
4 These descriptions share some similarities with Frijda’s (1986) account, but he focuses on the action 
readiness component, and not on the gerundival aspect. 
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according to the interactive dance between the micro emotional states of the perceiver and the 
perceived demands of the other (cf. Withagen, 2018, p. 25). 
 [SEE NEXT PAGE] 
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Figure 5. Emotional demand illustrated for five emotions. 
Shows reciprocal action urges (self) and demand characters (world). For example, anger is an 
experience of an object to-be-attacked, and a reciprocal urge to attack. 
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5.1. Relation of the emotional demand model to other recent ecological accounts of 
emotion 
The model shares some similarities and differences with the recent “extended 
emotions” approach (see Krueger & Szanto, 2016). According to this view, emotions involve 
the world because “some emotions incorporate external resources and thus extend beyond the 
neurophysiological confines of organisms” (Krueger & Szanto, 2016, p. 863). One example 
of this given by Krueger and Szanto is a musician playing an instrument whereby the 
“physical qualities of the instrument and the auditory properties of the produced 
sound…regulate[s] the dynamics of their experience in real time” (p. 867). Another example 
is the emotional interaction between a parent and an infant, whereby the infant relies on input 
from the parent to regulate their emotion, input such as smiling, caressing, diverting attention, 
etc. This can create “mutual affect” in which emotional states are shared between the infant 
and the caregiver. It has also been argued that some social practices create “affective niches”, 
which are “instances of organism-environment couplings…that enable the realization of 
specific affective states” (Colombetti & Krueger, 2015, p. 1160), for example, wearing 
brightly coloured clothes on rainy days, or listening to a particular playlist on a portable 
music device, to regulate one’s mood. 
How does the extended emotions thesis relate to the emotional demand model? One 
difference is that the emotional demand model is concerned with the transformed appearance 
of the world in emotion (cf. Sartre, 1939/1962) and the actions relevant to that 
transformation, rather than with the more pragmatic or instrumental actions that may underlie 
an affective niche. For example, wearing brightly coloured clothes to affect one’s mood is a 
more instrumental connection to the world than the “magical” transformation of someone 
from “to-be-cared for” to “to-be-attacked”. 
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On the other hand, one criticism that has been levelled at the extended emotions thesis 
can be defended by the emotional demand model.  Griffiths and Scarantino (2009) argue that 
the extended emotions thesis “potentially confuses the claim that the environment makes a 
causal contribution to a mental processes with the more ontologically demanding claim that it 
is a constituent part of it” (p. 448). But the extended emotions thesis requires a special kind of 
coupling between emotion and environment that counts as the environment being constitutive 
of the emotion (Krueger & Szanto, 2016). 
The emotional demand model specifies a coupling of this sort. According to the 
emotional demand model, a certain kind of experienced world is constitutive of emotion, and 
is sufficient for an instance of that emotion to exist. For example, to experience a world 
barren of possibilities is sufficient for the experience of despair (it is despair), or to 
experience a spider as “never-too-much-to-be-avoided” is sufficient to experience fear. 
Insofar as the world is constitutive of emotion in an extended emotions approach, then the 
emotional demand model is one version of an extended emotions account. The demanding or 
gerundival world exists as part of emotion experience and in this sense an emotion extends 
beyond the head or body. 
How does the emotional demand model relate to Gibsonian accounts of emotion? 
Gibson’s (1986) notion of “affordances” was influenced by Lewin’s idea of demand character 
(which Gibson thought was too subjectivist), but Gibson wanted to strip the idea of its 
dependence on individual motivation. His notion of “affordances” was thus defined on in 
terms of action “possibilities” rather than actions as “demanded” by the environment. Thus 
for Gibson, affordances “are not properties of the phenomenological world that depend on the 
state of the observer; rather, they are ecological phenomena that exist in the environment” 
(Withagen et al 2012, p. 251). As Gibson (1982) wrote: “The perception of what something 
affords should not be confused with the “coloring” of experience by needs or motives. Tastes 
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and preferences fluctuate. Something that looks good today may look bad tomorrow but what 
it actually offers the observer will stay the same” (cited in Withagen et al 2012, p. 251). 
Recently Withagen, 2018, has put forward a more nuanced account of this – see below. 
However, if affordances do not change according to the needs and motives of the 
organism then they are not a good candidate for explaining WFEE. For it is precisely the fact 
that demand characteristics change according to emotion – that someone is to-be-hugged 
when I love them and to-be-attacked when I hate them – that is what needs to be explained. 
As standing apes with arms that are not needed for locomotion, our ecological situation is 
such that other members of our species afford many different actions such as embracing, 
hitting, stroking, etc. But it is precisely when these different actions seem to be compelled or 
demanded by our experience of others that needs to be explained by the student of emotion 
experience: why does someone afford hugging at one time and afford hitting at another? It is 
indeed the colouring of the world by needs and motives that is relevant for emotion 
experience. That is why Lewin’s notion of demand character is superior to Gibson’s notion of 
affordance in characterizing WFEE. 
More recently, Withagen (2018) has put forward an ecological account of emotion 
that does indeed take into account variations in affordances depending on characteristics of 
the individual. Rather than defining affordances as “mere possibilities for action that exist 
independently of the animal’s experiences” (p. 22), Withagen provides a “user-based account 
of information”. On this account, information from the world is not simply “picked up” from 
the ambient array but rather what is picked up depends on characteristics of the perceiver, 
such as their developmental history.  
“The pattern in the optic array may be the result of laws of optics and the physical 
structure of the environment, but what the detection of the pattern does is a joint 
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product of the pattern and the developmental history of the person who is affected by 
it” (p. 25).  
For example, two people may react differently to a critical remark from their boss, depending 
on their different developmental history. Relating this to Dewey’s theory, he says that “there 
is no mediating process of appraising between the perception of the environment and the 
elicitation of the emotion. Rather the “stimulus” has an affective quality” (p. 25). 
 Withagen’s (2018) approach is consistent with the emotional demand model. Where it 
differs is in the specification of what the perceiver brings to the experience. The emotional 
demand model gives a detailed specification of different kinds of action readiness/gerundival 
perception couplings typical of different emotions, whereas Withagen focuses more on 
individual differences in developmental history. These are perhaps superficial differences as 
both models can account for changes in world perception as a result of the state of the 
organism. 
6. Implications and Conclusions 
The emotional demand character model of WFEE has potential benefits for several different 
areas of psychological theory, including autism, theory of mind, and emotion regulation. 
6.1. Implications for autism and theory of mind—distinguishing expressions and 
demands 
The Emotional Demand Model makes clear a hitherto neglected distinction between the 
expressive and demanding qualities of emotional objects (see Figure 1). This explains both 
everyday phenomena of how we react to emotional objects such as facial expressions and 
stressful situations, and also may account for certain puzzling phenomena in atypical 
development.  
For example, consider the findings that children with autism often have difficulties 
understanding what negative emotion faces express (Hobson, 1986; Uljarevic & Hamilton, 
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2013) but nevertheless can find them distressing (Smith, 2009; Matsuda, Minagawa & 
Yamamo, 2015). The conjunction of these two findings is puzzling from both “mind-reading” 
accounts and empathic contagion accounts of how people respond to the emotional states of 
others. On mind-reading (theory of mind) accounts, people confronted by another’s 
emotional expression will try to infer the other person’s mental state and respond to that, but 
this is something that people with autism seem to have difficulties with, so what makes them 
respond to emotional faces? Perhaps they respond via empathic contagion, i.e. a process by 
which another person’s emotion state induces a similar emotion state in oneself (Tomkins, 
1962). But this account cannot work because an angry face often makes the receiver 
distressed or fearful, rather than angry; and this is true of both individuals with autism 
(Smith, 2009) and typically developing individuals (Haviland & Lelwicka, 1987). 
The Emotion Demand Model can solve this problem. It holds that demand characters 
and expressions (physiognomic characters) are different and therefore can be processed 
differently. Someone could experience the demand character of a face – i.e. they directly 
experience the face as “scary” or “to be avoided”, even without any current expressive 
knowledge that the face represents a state of “anger” in the person.5 Indeed the finding that 
even simple eye-contact may be more threatening to people with autism (Dalton et al, 2005) 
shows that eye-contact may possess more demand character rather than expressive character 
for them, and this is backed up by their difficulties with the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
Test (Golan & Baron-Cohen, 2006). Some of the difficulties associated with autism may be 
difficulties in understanding the expressive qualities of emotions, not their demanding 
                                                            
5 Note, in using the term “expression” I am not implying that the expression is separate from the 
emotion and is merely “expressive” of it. The anger face is part of the emotion of the person whose face it is 
(cf. Koffka, 1935; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962). But in calling this “anger” the perceiver is attending to the 
physiognomic properties of the emotion; in calling it or seeing it as “scary” the perceiver is attending instead 
to the demand properties of the emotion. In both cases the perceived properties are part of the emotion of 
the person being looked at, and not merely symptoms of it. 
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qualities, and the above findings empirically illustrate the distinction between the two 
qualities. 
Of course, the Emotional Demand Model is not limited to explaining the experience 
of people with autism. All situations are potentially demanding in some way for all living 
things (as Karl Popper, 1999, wrote, “all life is problem solving”). In terms of phenomenal 
experience, all conscious humans (and other conscious animals) will experience the 
demanding properties of their situation, and when they are in an emotion state these 
demanding properties are heightened in specific ways (i.e. leading to specific gerundival 
perceptions, such as experiencing something that must be avoided, or something that must be 
embraced, etc.). 
This model can also explain monkeys’ and apes’ fearful responses to angry faces 
(Köhler, 1930). Monkeys will often respond fearfully to an open-mouthed anger face (Hadj-
Bousiane et al, 2008), in other words without showing contagion. This is also most 
parsimoniously explained as neither empathy nor activation of theory of mind, but simply as 
WFEE in the form of experiencing emotional demand character. 
 It is not just anger faces that have this quality – all emotional expressions have 
demand character. Consider the demand character of a sad face, and of expressions of sadness 
in general. Often an expression of sadness compels compassion in the viewer. The person is 
seen as “to-be-looked after”. In other words sadness demands or impels concern or caring 
behaviour. For example, in studies with preschool children, when an experimenter pretends to 
be sad or hurt, two year old children will typically will show comforting behaviour towards 
them (Zahn-Waxler et al. 1992), and even some preschoolers with ASD will do so (Yirmiya et 
al, 1992). 
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6.2. Implications for emotion regulation 
The Emotional Demand Model emphasizes that emotions are very compelling (see also 
Frijda, Ridderinkhof, & Rietveld, 2014) and that world-focused emotion experiences are a 
kind of “unawareness of emotion”. Both of these factors contribute to making emotion 
regulation difficult. First, in terms of compulsion, strong emotions are hard to inhibit and 
there is an impulsive quality to them. The number of knife stabs and gunshots in domestic 
murders, typically involving heated arguments, jealousy, and anger, is higher than in non-
domestic murders (Wolfgang, 1958; see p. 164). 
Second, what is meant by saying that WFEEs are a kind of unawareness of emotion? 
Not that WFEEs have no phenomenology – on the contrary, there is definitely “something it 
is like” to have a WFEE. But the person having a WFEE needs to shift attention in order to 
notice that their experience is part of an emotion. For example, people with anger disorders 
are sometimes unaware of their anger and are unable to label and own it, but nevertheless 
have strong feelings of “the world being against them” (Deffenbacher, 1995). Lambie & 
Marcel (2002) gave an account of such cases as needing a shift to self-focused attention, 
including attending to models of what anger is and how to spot anger in oneself. Similar 
processes are discussed by Linehan (1993) in relation to borderline personality disorder in 
which high emotionality can go hand in hand with poor awareness of emotion because the 
emotion is very world-directed. 
But even in everyday, non-clinical cases, emotions possess this character – of being 
very compelling and also sometimes very world-directed. For example, the world seems flat 
and boring (sadness), or the speech I am to give is very threatening, and the building in which 
I have to give it looks ominous (anxiety). 
What, then, is to be done to help with emotion regulation, according to the emotional 
demand character model? The first point is that being too “immersed” in a demanding world 
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is not conducive to emotion regulation. Lambie & Marcel (2002) distinguished between 
immersed and detached emotion experience, and argued that world-focused emotion 
experience tends to more immersed. Immersion means that you have direct engagement with 
the world in the manner of Sartre’s “non-reflective consciousness” (see section 3). For 
example, you experience people around you as annoying but you do not experience this as 
“anger in me”. In order to regulate the emotion, you need to move to a more detached mode 
of awareness (cf. Sartre’s “reflective consciousness”), in which you can take ownership of the 
emotion. So, the emotional demand model would emphasize that people need to recognize 
that “demanding world” experiences are indeed instances of emotion. The person who denies 
they are angry but asserts they are “surrounded by obstructive idiots” (see Deffenbacher, 
1995), needs help to recognize (a) that the experience of “being surrounded by obstructive 
idiots” is indeed part of anger, and that (b) trying to “detach” from the demandingness will 
help them to recognize and regulate the emotion (cf. both cognitive behaviour therapy, and 
mindfulness practice). 
For example, depression can include experiences such as “I’m up against the world”, 
“my future is bleak”; “it’s just not worth it” (Williams, Teasdale, Segal & Kabat-Zinn, 2007, 
pp. 171-2). These seem to be true if one is immersed in the emotion. But if one is able to see 
them as part of an emotion experience rather than as facts about the world, one is better able 
to make changes which will ultimately help regulate one’s mood. Williams, Teasdale, Segal 
& Kabat-Zinn (2007) reported a woman, Jade, who looked at a list of typical depressive 
thoughts, including the ones listed above, and said: “When I was in the middle of the 
depression I believed the thoughts 120 percent—this was how things were, no question. But 
now—now that I’m feeling okay most of the time—I don’t often have these thoughts, and if I 
do they just seem to be faint echoes of how they were then” (p. 173). 
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“This is how things are, no question” is often a feature of WFEE, but gaining 
understanding of emotional demand characters may be a first step in detaching from such 
“phenomenological truths” which can be constraining. In Figure 2, above, there is a 
hodological space diagram of hopelessness. Perhaps drawing such a diagram for oneself, or 
in therapy, and then trying to identify an exit on the diagram would be a way both to 
conceptualize the emotional demand character of one’s world, but also a route to freedom 
from it.  
The Emotional Demand Model can also explain and conceptualize the effects of the 
natural environment on wellbeing. For example, Roe & Aspinall (2011) studied “emotional 
affordances” in boys with emotional problems in a forest camp setting. They found that the 
forest camp led to more calm and less anger than the school setting where the boys spent 
most of their time. Their data is fascinating but I wish here to reconceptualize it.  
Here is how Roe and Aspinall framed their findings. Following Russell’s (1980) 
model of emotions they wrote “we have conceptualized an emotional affordance in terms of 
what is offered for pleasure/displeasure and arousal/relaxation” (p. 536)”. But the model of 
emotions they used is arguably ill-suited to understanding “emotion in the world”. Roe and 
Aspinall write at times in terms of the environment being a “stimulus” that causes a 
“valenced reaction” in the boys. There are two problems here. Talk of “stimuli” is slightly 
problematic to the affordance approach as on that approach objects are not viewed as stimuli 
causing responses, but rather affordances are perceived in objects and then are utilized by the 
actor (Gibson, 1986; but see Withagen, 2018 for a different slant on this).  
Second, and more importantly, on Russell’s model the emotion is a self-state (e.g. I 
experience pleasure and activation as feelings in myself), rather than the emotion being 
embedded in the self-object relationship. What is needed is a model of emotion that does not 
view emotion simply as a self-state but which does justice to how the self and the world are 
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both constitutive of an emotion. It is the latter approach which seems warranted by the forest 
setting data, and which arguably the Emotional Demand Model can supply. 
So what would Roe and Aspinall’s findings, and the emotion regulation implied by 
them, look like under the Emotional Demand Model? Here are some of their key findings, as 
summarized in their discussion, and followed by my gloss (in italics) using the Emotional 
Demand Model.  
1. Anger was greatly reduced in the forest setting as compared to the classroom. 
Fewer people and objects were perceived as “to-be-attacked” in the forest setting.  
2. The ambience of calm was higher in the forest in comparison to the classroom. The 
world of the forest was to be dealt with more gently, with more ease.  
3. There were improved relationships between the boys and their peers, and with the 
staff. In the forest setting, people were experienced as to-be-trusted. (Roe and Aspinall indeed 
follow this interpretation, by saying there were more “affordances for trust”).  
4. Cooking and eating around the camp fire nurtured socialization, and there was a 
theme of homeliness, “reflected in the construction of dens, shelters and hammocks, offering 
places to retreat and be alone….places to share time with a peer, or as stimuli for imaginative 
home-making games”. Being in this setting created paths in the boy’s hodological space 
leading to safety, comfort, and social interaction. 
 
6.3. Conclusion 
World-focused emotion experience is an overlooked aspect of emotion that is best explained 
using the Gestalt psychology concepts of demand character and hodological space. Emotion 
experience involves, not just awareness of one’s body or one’s feelings, but also awareness of 
a demanding world which impels actions, and which contains paths of varying difficulty and 
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ease. Emotional demand character connects the idea that emotions involve both striving in 
oneself and value in the world. They are the world-focused counterpart of action readiness. 
Understanding the idea of emotional demand character, and explaining it to people, 
may help individuals increase their agency while also helping them see how strong emotions 
make life hard as they have a tendency to “push you around”. It is not a paradox to say that to 
realize how impelling emotions can be can help one to resist them. The less we are aware of 
emotions as emotions the more we are a slave to them (see Lambie, 2008). Or, to put it the 
other way round, the more we realize that the demanding world is sometimes constraining 
because of our emotional state, the more we can be free of that demand. 
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Appendix: Note on translating Lewin – valence, demand character, or affordance? 
Confusingly, Lewin’s term Aufforderungscharaktere led to two influential English terms in 
psychology: “valence” and “affordance”, neither of which actually mean what 
Aufforderungscharaktere means. That is why in this paper, I have followed Koffka (1935) in 
translating Aufforderungscharaktere as “demand character”. This section gives a brief 
justification. 
 First, let us contrast the two different translations. Here is a small quotation from 
Lewin’s original 1926 paper: 
Ja, bis zu einem gewissen Grade sind die Aussagen: “das und das Bedürfnis besteht” 
und “der und der Bereich von Gebilden besitzt einen Aufforderungscharakter zu den 
und den Handlungen”, äquivalent (Lewin, 1926, p. 353). 
Here is Rapaport’s translation, originally from 1951 and reprinted in 1999: 
the proposition that “such-and-such a need exists” is to a certain extent equivalent to 
the proposition that “such-and-such a region of structures has a valence for such-and-
such actions”. (Lewin, 1926/1999, p. 97). 
And here is Koffka’s (1935) translation: 
To a certain degree the two propositions: ‘this or that need exists’ and ‘this or that 
range of objects possesses a demand character for these or those actions’ are 
equivalent. (Koffka, 1935, p. 345). 
The official line was to ignore Koffka and translate Aufforderungscharakter as “valence”. 
This was established by the translators of Lewin’s influential 1935 book A Dynamic Theory 
of Personality. The translators D.K. Adams and K.E. Zener had a footnote the first time they 
used the word “valence” to translate Aufforderungscharakter. After this passage from Lewin 
(1935): 
Many things attract the child to eating, others to climbing, to grasping, to 
manipulation, to sucking, to raging at them, etc. These imperative environmental facts 
– we shall call them valences [Aufforderungscharakter] – determine the direction of 
the behavior (p. 77) 
They write in a footnote: 
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A fairly precise translation of Aufforderungscharakter is the term “demand value” 
which Tolman… uses for the same concept. In order to avoid unnecessary 
misunderstandings, Professor Tolman and Lewin have agreed to use the same term 
and at Tolman’s suggestion have chosen “valence”. There is no good English 
equivalent for Aufforderungscharakter as the author uses it… Perhaps the most nearly 
accurate translation for the expression would be “compulsive character”, but that is 
cumbrous and a shade too strong…It should be noted that, in contrast to chemical 
valence, which is only positive, psychological valence…may be either positive 
(attracting) or negative (repelling), and that an object or activity loses or acquires 
valence (of either kind) in accordance with the needs of the organism. (Translators 
note; Lewin, 1935, p, 77n). 
From then on Aufforderungscharakter was always translated as “valence”. Indeed the OED 
has this as the first usage of valence in its psychological sense. But this usage led to two 
problems and two confusions. First, valence is not the same as Aufforderungscharakter. 
According to Lewin (1926/1999, p. 95) “It would be, however, a mistake to assume that this 
[attraction and repulsion] is the crucial feature of demand characters 
[Aufforderungscharakter]”. Instead, “It is more characteristic for demand characters that they 
press toward definite actions, the range of which may be narrow or broad…The book entices 
reading, the cake to eating, the ocean to swimming” (p. 95). Lewin of course may have 
changed his mind by 1935, but the original concept of demand character, it is argued in the 
present paper, has much more explanatory power than the thin concept of valence. 
 Second, Gibson (1986) adapted Lewin’s Aufforderungscharakter for his notion of 
affordances, but crucially he stripped any dependence on the subject’s own need state from 
the concept (see section 2.5.). There may be very good reasons for this, but it must be kept in 
mind that affordances, valence, and demand character mean three very different things: 
affordances are environmental possibilities for action (and do not depend on need), valences 
are attractive or repulsive qualities of objects, and demand characters are the specific action-
impelling qualities of objects, which depend reciprocally on the organism’s need state. 
